I. Marrying Federalism with Ethnicity
‘’The Ethiopian 1995 ‘’Constitution’’ misses an opportunity to respond ethnic concerns without freezing ethnicity as an exclusive political identity.’’
Even though politicization of ethnicity and its emergence in the Ethiopian political scene harks back to the days of the student movement, geographic logic of the current constitution inherent in the territorial structure of the state has markedly amplified the political relevance of ethnic identities. The constitutional decision to use ethnicity as a basis for the organization of the state represents a recognition of the political relevance of ethnicity and overlooked the consideration of another historically and politically relevant identity-‘provincialism’ The decision that each major ethnic group (e.g. Oromia, Amhara, Somali…) should be dominant in one and only subnational unit has also proved to be the original sin, as it has elevated ethnic identity to a primary political identity.
Art. 39 and 47 of the constitution show, the Constitution has organized the federation along ethnic lines, rather than geography or administrative convenience and the geographical configuration based on ‘the basis of settlement patterns, language, identity, and consent of the people concerned.’ Thus the federation can be expressed as a league of multi-national federations (internal boundary of a state along ethnic line) as opposed to mono-national federation.
The Constitution, by including the ethnic factor in the territorial design of the state, translated the cultural communities (ethnic identities were mere cultural dimension) into political communities (politically relevant identities). This has radicalized ethnic allegiance, contribute to the ethnicization of the system, cause continuous tension and puts a limit on inter-ethnic relations.
To reconfigure a federation that may not be multi- national but yet reflects a political recognition of cultural communities–dividing numerically large ethnic group into a number of constituent units without, however, denying ethnic groups territorial autonomy opportunity. It enhances intra-ethnic competition- downgrade the status of ethnicity as the primary basis for political identity; lessen secessionist pressure from large ethnic groups. Though, this should be an outcome of a negotiation.
References
1. Yonatan Tesfaye Fessha (2016): The Original Sin of Ethiopian Federalism, Ethnopolitics, DOI: 10.1080/17449057.2016.1254410
About the Author:
Andamlak Admasu, is a fourth year law student at Addis Ababa University, serving as a member of Legal Updates Team within the student-led Justice Club.
He can be contacted via email andmlakadmasu19@gmail.com
Final Note: This article is reviewed and contributed through the team of editors of Justice Club-Legal Updates Team, Addis Ababa University, to ensure it meets Insight Magazine standards.
